Sonoma — Order To Continue All Pending Small Claims Matters

Source: https://sonoma.courts.ca.gov/system/files/inreordertocontinueallpendingsmallclaimsmatters.pdf

TENTATIVE RULINGS LAW & MOTION CALENDAR Wednesday, February 4, 2026 3:00 pm Courtroom 19 –Hon. Oscar A. Pardo 3055 Cleveland Avenue, Santa Rosa

The tentative rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard. If you desire to appear and present oral argument, YOU MUST NOTIFY the Judge’s Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707) 521-6602, and all other opposing parties of your intent to appear, and whether that appearance is in person or via Zoom, no later 4:00 p.m. the court day immediately preceding the day of the hearing.

If the tentative ruling is accepted, no appearance is necessary unless otherwise indicated.

TO JOIN ZOOM ONLINE:

Department 19 Hearings MeetingID: 160-421-7577 Password: 410765 https://sonomacourt-org.zoomgov.com/j/1604217577

TO JOIN ZOOM BY PHONE: By Phone (same meeting ID and password as listed for each calendar): +1 669 254 5252 US (San Jose)

PLEASE NOTE: The Court’s Official Court Reporters are “not available” within the meaning of California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956, for court reporting of civil cases.

1. 23CV01882, Ramirez v. Reeds Trailer Sales, Inc.

Plaintiff David Ramirez (“Plaintiff”) filed the currently operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) in this action against defendants Reed’s Trailer Sales Inc. (“Defendant”), and Does 1- 25, arising out of Defendant’s sale of a recreational vehicle (the “Vehicle”) to Plaintiff. The FAC contains causes of action for: 1) violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Civ. Code § 1790 et seq. (the “Act”); 2) Negligent Repair; 3) Violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Civ. Code § 1750, et seq (the “CRLA”); 4) violations of the Automobile Sales Finance Act, Civ. Code § 2981 et seq. (the “ASFA”); and 5) unfair and deceptive business practices under the Unfair Competition Law, Bus. & Prof. Code §17200, et seq (the “UCL”).

This matter is on calendar for Defendant’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (“CCP”) § 430.10(e) for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The Demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

I. Governing Law

A. Demurrers

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A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. CCP § 430.30(a). In the event a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend should be granted where the complaint’s defect can be cured by amendment. The Swahn Group, Inc. v. Segal (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 831, 852. Furthermore, a demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. CCP § 430.30(a).

“On a demurrer a court’s function is limited to testing the legal sufficiency of the complaint. [Citation.] ‘A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts.’ [Citation.] The hearing on demurrer may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the guise of having the court take judicial notice of documents whose truthfulness or proper interpretation are disputable. [Citation.]”). Bounds v. Sup. Ct. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 468, 477-478. “(A) court cannot by means of judicial notice convert a demurrer into an incomplete evidentiary hearing in which the demurring party can present documentary evidence and the opposing party is bound by what that evidence appears to show.”

Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 115.

At demurrer, all facts properly pleaded are treated as admitted, but contentions, deductions and conclusions of fact or law are disregarded. Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591. Similarly, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or facts which are judicially noticed are also disregarded. Coshow v. City of Escondido (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 687, 702. Generally, the pleadings “must allege the ultimate facts necessary to the statement of an actionable claim. It is both improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead the evidence by which he hopes to prove such ultimate facts.” Careau & Co. v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App. 3d 1371, 1390; FPI Develop., Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384. Each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of a party’s proof does not need to be alleged. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872. Conclusory pleadings are permissible and appropriate where supported by properly pleaded facts. Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6. “The distinction between conclusions of law and ultimate facts is not at all clear and involves at most a matter of degree.” Burks v. Poppy Const. Co. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 463, 473. Leave to amend should generally be granted liberally where there is some reasonable possibility that a party may cure the defect through amendment. Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.

B. Statute of Limitations

Demurrers shall not be sustained based on statute of limitations unless the complaint shows clearly and affirmatively that the action is so barred. Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City of San Francisco (2003) 29 Cal.4th 769, 780. “It is not enough that a complaint shows that the action may be barred.” Id. If the failure of the cause of action due to the statute of limitations is

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apparent on the face of the complaint, the demurrer must be sustained. SLPR, L.L.C. v. San Diego Unified Port District (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 284, 321. Where the demurrer based on statute of limitations is argued from judicially noticed documents, the truth of dates within those documents is inadmissible hearsay, and is not appropriate for judicial notice. Richtek USA, Inc. v. uPI Semiconductor Corp. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 651, 660-661. To sustain demurrer on such judicially noticed material is error. Id.

“Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at ‘the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.’ (Citation.) An important exception to the general rule of accrual is the “discovery rule,” which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.” Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806–807 (internal citations omitted).

“The relation-back doctrine requires that the amended complaint must (1) rest on the same general set of facts, (2) involve the same injury, and (3) refer to the same instrumentality, as the original one.” Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 408–409.

C. Automobile Sales Finance Act

The purpose of the Auto Sales Finance Act (“ASFA”) is “to protect purchasers of motor vehicles against excessive charges by requiring full disclosure of all items of cost (citation); the form and requisites prescribed by the statute are mandatory; a contract which does not substantially conform thereto is unenforceable; and a buyer who has made payments to the seller under such a contract may recover them . . .” Hernandez v. Atlantic Finance Co. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 65, 69 (internal quotations omitted). Where cost items that comprise the amount financed are inaccurate, that conduct violates the ASFA’s disclosure provisions. Thompson v. 10,000 RV Sales, Inc. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 950, 973.

“The act provides that every conditional sales contract shall disclose to the buyer all details concerning the sale, financing, and complete costs of the purchase of the motor vehicle. Eighteen separate items are specified for disclosure. The act requires that all of the terms and agreements must be contained in a single document, and sets a maximum interest rate chargeable for the financing of the automobile.” Hernandez v. Atlantic Finance Co. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 65, 70. ASFA claims, because of the punitive nature of the recission and restitution remedies under Civ. Code § 2983 and 2983.1, fall under CCP § 340 and have a one-year statute of limitations. Pompey v. Bank of Stockton (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1079, 1099.

II. Analysis

A. Demurrer

Defendant argues that Plaintiff have failed to timely plead their cause of action for violations of the ASFA, as there were no facts related to the ASFA in the original complaint filed (the “Complaint”) sufficient that the assertion of the cause of action for the first time in the FAC should “relate back” to the original filing date. Given that the FAC was filed on September 2, 2025, the RISC was executed September 16, 2023, and claims for recission under the ASFA

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have a statute of limitations of one year, the claim appears facially time barred unless it relates back to the filing of the Complaint on December 6, 2023.

Plaintiff opines that he has pled sufficient facts in the Complaint to find that the relation back doctrine applies. To relate back, Plaintiff must plead the same general set of facts, the same injuries, and the same instrumentalities. Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 408–409. Failure to show these commonalities means claims which are untimely at the time of amendment are barred. While Plaintiff argues that the allegations relate to the same instrumentality and general facts, most of Plaintiff’s claims are related to warranty and merchantability concerns. Plaintiffs in Song-Beverly cases commonly point out that manufacturer warranty claims are separate and distinct from the underlying sale. See Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1122, 1134. To the degree that Plaintiff argues that the terms of the service contract were not sufficiently disclosed (Complaint, ¶ 43-44), this doesn’t appear to implicate the same issue as the financing of that service contract (FAC ¶ 59-60).

Plaintiff’s averment that “(w)hile some of the pled facts are very specific as to the acts complained of, some are more general in nature” is telling. While Plaintiff avers “mis- statements” and failures to disclose, no such general averments are facts as required to cognizable state causes of action. Plaintiff points to Complaint paragraphs 25, 26, 30, 38, 40, 42- 45, 47 and 50 as examples of allegations related to the same general theme of misrepresentations, but that does not appear sufficient, because none of those allegations relate to the terms of the RISC itself. This is further supported by the general pleading principles around misrepresentation causes of action, in which “each element must be pled with specificity”. Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1166. Nor does the general averment that Defendant failed to make statutorily required disclosures put Defendant on notice of the specific statutory violations included for the first time in the FAC. Plaintiff’s utilization of vague, conclusory language in the Complaint cannot be treated as having put Defendant on notice for the incredibly specific claim of ASFA violations. No facts are pled which may have sufficiently informed Defendants that the nature of the damages related to an ASFA violation.

The most illuminative case displaying the function of instrumentalities is Coronet Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 342. As our high court later summarized:

In Coronet, the original complaint in an action for wrongful death alleged that plaintiffs' daughter was electrocuted while using a dangerous instrumentality—a defective hair dryer. The defendants were the corporation that manufactured the hair dryer and a number of Doe component suppliers. The amended complaint, which identified Coronet for the first time as one of the Doe component suppliers, was filed after the statute of limitation had run as to the original complaint. The amended complaint, however, alleged that the dangerous instrumentality was a lamp socket and switch manufactured by Coronet rather than a hair dryer.

The court held that the amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint, and was thus barred by the statute of limitations. The court

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announced that an amended complaint relates back only if it is based on the same operative facts, and refers to the same “offending instrumentality” and “accident.” The amended complaint before the court did not relate back because “[t]he difference between being electrocuted by a hair dryer and being electrocuted by a table lamp is as great as being electrocuted by the hair dryer and being poisoned by some improperly processed food found on the kitchen shelf. Although they relate to a single death at a single location, they are different ‘accidents' and involve different instrumentalities.”

Barrington v. A. H. Robins Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 146, 151.

The instrumentalities at issue are distinct. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the sale as it relates to the condition and service of the vehicle is the basis for their harm. In making the ASFA claim, Plaintiff now contends that the purchase transaction itself was flawed financially, bearing no resemblance to claims relating to the need to conform the vehicle to warranties. The instrumentalities are distinct.

Damages is a far clearer matter. Plaintiff’s averment that they were damaged because defendant made “misrepresentations and failed to disclose statutorily required information” does not sufficiently expound on the nature of the damages at issue. This is clearly denoted by the difference in the nature of the damages pled for the different causes of action. As was noted by the court in Pompey v. Bank of Stockton (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1079, 1098, this is strongly distinguishable from Song-Beverly claims because of the non-discretionary nature of the penalties. Furthermore, that court noted the difference in allowable damages, as claims under the Song-Beverly act allow reductions in Plaintiff’s recovery for use of the vehicle, which is an equitable consideration expressly disallowed under the ASFA. Id. at 1097-1098. While both Plaintiff’s claims generally relate to a contract, the injuries (and remedies) are distinct between recission under the ASFA and the required repurchase under the Song-Beverly Act.

Plaintiff did not plead facts within the Complaint sufficient to allow their ASFA claim to relate back to the filing date of the original Complaint. Accordingly, the ASFA claim is time barred. The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is SUSTAINED.

III. Leave to Amend

Claims which are time barred on their face under the applicable statute of limitations cannot typically be cured through amendment. Engel v. Pech (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1235. Any leave to amend appears to be futile to cure the deficiencies identified here. Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Demurrer is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Defendant shall submit a written order to the Court consistent with this tentative ruling and in compliance with Rule of Court 3.1312(a) and (b).

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2. 24CV02095, Discover Bank v. Chea

Plaintiff Discover Bank (“Plaintiff”) filed the complaint in this action against defendant Jenny Chea (“Defendant”), with a cause of action for common counts. This matter is on calendar for Plaintiff’s motion pursuant to pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (“CCP”) § 664.6 and the settlement agreement filed October 30, 2024 (the “Agreement”) to enter judgment in the case in the amount of $7,164.08, as Defendant has defaulted on the agreement. There is no opposition to the motion.

The Motion is DENIED without prejudice.

I. Governing Law

CCP § 664.6(a) provides: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.” CCP § 664.6(b) provides that a written agreement is enforceable if signed by a party, that party’s attorney, or an insurer’s authorized agent. See also Provost v. Regents of University of California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1295. Like proving a contract, in order to have an enforceable agreement under CCP § 664.6, the moving party must show that there was mutual consent to common terms. Bowers v. Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 724, 732-733. A motion to enforce a settlement agreement under CCP § 664.6 must show there is an agreement signed by all the parties to the agreement, not just the parties against whom the agreement is sought to be enforced. Sully-Miller Contracting Co. v. Gledson/Cashman Construction, Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 30, 37.

Where the terms of a settlement are disputed in a CCP § 664.6 motion, the court has the authority to adjudicate those disputes based on declarations or other evidence. Malouf Bros. v. Dixon (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 280, 284. However, the court does not have the authority to modify the terms of the agreement. Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 779, 795. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in ruling on a motion under CCP § 664.6. Corkland v. Boscoe (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 989, 992.

II. Analysis

Plaintiff moves the Court for a judgment pursuant to the Agreement. Plaintiff asks for $15,724.02 in principle, and $515.21 in costs. The Agreement states that Defendant owes $19,763.02. The Agreement states that Defendant is to receive credit for any and all payments made. Defendant was to make monthly payments under the terms of the Agreement of $577 per month starting on August 28, 2024, with a final payment due on July 28, 2026. Plaintiff was entitled to a discount resulting in early payoff if she made all timely payments. Agreement ¶ 4. Plaintiff avers that Defendant made his last payment on the credit account on February 26, 2025. Defendant paid a total of $4,039.00. See Counsel’s declaration ¶ 7.

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This motion is unopposed.

The Agreement states that upon Defendant’s failure to make a timely payment, Plaintiff will be entitled to “immediately” “pursue all available remedies”, including “have judgment entered against Defendant for $19,763.02, plus court costs, less any payments by Defendant. Agreement ¶ 6. This appears sufficient to place Defendant on notice that payments needed to be made in a timely manner otherwise Plaintiff was authorized to seek relief from this Court in the form of a judgment. Therefore, the amounts of $15,724.02 in principle, and $515.21 in costs are appropriate.

Therefore, the Motion is GRANTED. Judgment will be entered in the amount of $16,239.23.

3. 24CV07555, Stewart v. Fay Servicing, LLC

Plaintiffs Kara Michelle Stewart and Christopher Charles Stewart (“Plaintiff”) filed the complaint (the “Complaint”) in this action against defendants the Fay Servicing, LLC (“Fay”), U.S. Bank Trust national Association, as trustee of the LSF9 Master Participation Trust (“US Bank”, together with Fay, “Defendants”), and Does 1-20, for multiple alleged causes of action arising out of a mortgage transaction.

This matter is on calendar for the motion by Plaintiffs for leave to amend the Complaint (the “FAC”) pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (“CCP”) § 473(a)(1). The motion is DENIED without prejudice.

I. Governing Authorities

The California Code of Civil Procedure provides that a court “may in the furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper” allow a party to amend any pleading to correct a mistake. CCP § 473(a)(1). Likewise, the court may “in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars”. CCP § 473(a)(1). The general rule is “liberal allowance of amendments.” Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939; see Lincoln Property Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 905, 916. The “policy of great liberality” applies to amendments “at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial.” Magpali v. Farmers Group (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487. “Absent a showing of prejudice to the adverse party, the rule of great liberality in allowing amendment of pleadings will prevail.” Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal. App.4th 1154, 1163.

Absent a showing of prejudice, delay alone is not a basis for denial of leave to amend. Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 563. “(I)t is irrelevant that new legal theories are introduced as long as the proposed amendments relate to the same general set of facts.” Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048 [internal citations omitted].

The cases on amending pleadings during trial suggest trial courts should be guided by two general principles: (1) whether facts or legal theories are being changed and (2) whether the opposing party will be prejudiced by the

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proposed amendment. Frequently, each principle represents a different side of the same coin: If new facts are being alleged, prejudice may easily result because of the inability of the other party to investigate the validity of the factual allegations while engaged in trial or to call rebuttal witnesses. If the same set of facts supports merely a different theory [then] no prejudice can result.

McMillin v. Eare (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 893, 910, quoting City of Stanton v. Cox (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1563.

It is within the Court’s discretion to deny leave to amend where the amendment has been pursued in a dilatory manner, and that delay has prejudiced other parties. Prejudice exists where the amendment would result in the delay of trial, where there has been a critical loss of evidence, where amendment would add substantially to the costs of preparation, or where it would substantially increase the burdens of discovery. Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488; see P & D Consultants, Inc. v. City of Carlsbad (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1345; Fisher v. Larsen (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 627, 649.

Great liberality applies to amendment unless the amendment raises new and substantially different issues from those already pleaded. McMillin v. Eare, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at 1379. In exercising its discretion over amendment, the court will consider whether there is a reasonable excuse for the delay, whether the change relates to facts or legal theories, and whether the opposing party will be prejudiced by the amendment. Duchrow v. Forrest (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1378. The underlying merits of the proposed cause of action amendments are not relevant to determining whether amendment is appropriate, as long as they relate to the same general set of facts, as the amended pleadings may be attacked by demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings, or other similar proceedings. Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048. Denying leave to amend due to failure to sufficiently plead a cause of action would be most appropriate where the defect cannot be cured by further amendment. California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274, 280– 281; disapproved of on different grounds by Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 390. The exception would lie where a plaintiff makes contradictory pleadings. “As a general rule a party will not be allowed to file an amendment contradicting an admission made in his original pleadings. If it be proper in any case, it must be upon very satisfactory evidence that the party has been deceived or misled, or that his pleading was put in under a clear mistake as to the facts.” Brown v. Aguilar (1927) 202 Cal. 143, 149.

Amendment of a complaint is not the proper procedure for adding allegations which have occurred after the filing of the initial complaint, rather such allegations should be added through a supplemental complaint under CCP § 464. Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd. (1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 426. However, the substance of a request, and not the title, is the proper measure of the sufficiency of a pleading. Hutnick v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 456, 464, fn.6. It is not proper for supplemental pleadings to allege new causes of action or defenses, rather the new facts must “supplement” the already alleged causes of action. Flood v. Simpson (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 644, 647.

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II. Analysis

While the Court is not necessarily persuaded by Defendants’ positions regarding the propriety of amendment on the substance of the request1, the request to amend is misguided and proffers the change to the FAC in an improper form based on the substance of the new allegations.

Procedurally, the added allegations are not properly a motion to amend, but rather a motion to supplement the FAC. A motion to amend should not allege facts which occur after the filing of the complaint. Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd. (1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 426. Conversely, a motion to supplement the complaint should not seek to add causes of action. Flood v. Simpson (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 644, 647. Here, Plaintiffs seek only to add sparse factual allegations regarding facts occurring after the initiation of this action. Plaintiff asserts no new causes of action, only contending that the addition of the after occurring fact is indicative of the merits of the underlying causes of action already pled. This is precisely the purpose of a supplemental complaint. CCP § 464. However, supplemental complaints do not supersede the original pleading or assert new causes of action but rather add specific factual allegations to be considered in conjunction with the FAC. Accordingly, presenting the supplemental complaint in the form of the entire FAC, plus the supplemental allegations appears improper. A supplemental complaint is a separate pleading which should be capable of reference independent of the FAC. Based on the above, the Court finds that the motion is procedurally infirm, as “amendment” is not the proper procedure by which Plaintiff may add the new allegations. Given that the decision is not predicated on the merits, the motion for leave to amend is DENIED without prejudice. Defendants’ counsel shall submit a written order to the court consistent with this ruling and in compliance with Rule of Court 3.1312(a) and (b).

4. 24CV07653, Velazquez v. Sinjh

Plaintiffs Minette Savanna Velasquez and Yoselin Hermosillo Guzman (“Plaintiffs”) filed the complaint (the “Complaint”) in this action against defendants the Grizzlyz Inc. (“Grizzlyz”) and Tony Sinjh (“Sinjh”, together with Grizzlyz, “Defendants”), and Does 1-50, for multiple alleged causes of action including sexual harassment, various theories of discrimination, retaliation, whistleblower, and various other Labor Code violations.

This matter is on calendar for the motion by Plaintiff to compel responses to interrogatories and requests for production of documents.

Under CCP § 2024.020, the discovery cut-off is based on the date initially set for trial, and as such, a trial continuance or postponement of the trial date does not operate to reopen discovery. See Pelton-Shepherd Industries, Inc. v. Delta Packaging Products, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1575. Discovery is to be completed 30 days prior to initial trial date, and motions regarding discovery are to be heard no later than 15 days before the initial trial date. Ibid. “The purpose of imposing a time limit on discovery is to expedite and facilitate trial preparation and to prevent delay. Without a cutoff date, the parties could tie up each other and the trial court in

1 Indeed, the FAC alleges no new causes of action and Defendants have Answered the FAC rather than demurred. Given that the Proposed SAC offers no new causes of action, their averment of the infirmity of the causes of action is not persuasive, as they have failed to raise it when the opportunity arose. See CCP § 430.41(b).

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discovery and discovery disputes right up to the eve of trial or beyond. Furthermore, as defendants point out, to be effective the cutoff date must be firm or some litigants will manipulate the proceedings to avoid the cut-off date.” Beverly Hosp. v. Sup. Ct. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1295 (articulating purpose of cut-off in context of holding that notwithstanding statutory reference to “initial trial date,” permitting additional discovery following a mistrial, order granting new trial or reversal on appeal is consistent with the overall purposes of the discovery rules).

The parties are set to proceed to trial just two days after this motion is set to be heard. Discovery motions must be heard at least 15 days before trial. Discovery is closed and therefore the motion is properly DENIED.

Plaintiff makes no meritorious attempt to meet the good cause factors for re-opening discovery. There is no motion adequate to meet the four factors defined under CCP § 2024.050. Plaintiff failing to make such a showing, it would be error to re-open discovery. Pelton-Shepherd Industries, Inc. v. Delta Packaging Products, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1586.

Plaintiffs shall submit a written order to the Court consistent with this tentative ruling and in compliance with Rule of Court 3.1312(a) and (b).

5-6. 25CV04270, Diaz v. County of Sonoma

Plaintiff, Esteban Diaz (“Plaintiff”), has filed the complaint (the “Complaint”) against defendants County of Sonoma (“Defendant”), and Does 1-10 with a cause of action to set aside the judgment in case SCV-265769 (the “Prior Action”).

This matter is on calendar for demurrer to the Complaint filed by Defendant for failure to state a cause of action, and the motion to strike particular allegations from the Complaint.

I. Governing Law

A. Motions to Strike

A motion to strike lies where a pleading contains “irrelevant, false, or improper matter[s]” or is “not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” CCP § 436(b). However, “falsity,” must be demonstrated by reference to the pleading itself or of judicially noticeable matters, not extraneous facts. See CCP § 437. In general, as with showing fraud, oppression, or malice sufficient to support punitive damages, while plaintiffs must plead facts, with respect to intent and the like, a “general allegation of intent is sufficient.” Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 632. Irrelevant matters subject to being struck are “(a)n allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense”, “(a)n allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense”, and “(a) demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint” CCP, § 431.10 (b-c); CCP § 436.

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“While under section 436, a court at any time may, in its discretion, strike portions of a complaint that are irrelevant, improper, or not drawn in conformity with the law, matter that is essential to a cause of action should not be struck and it is error to do so.” Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1281. However, “(i)rrelevant matter, though pleaded, is still irrelevant.” Fisher v. Nash Bldg. Co. (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 397, 403.

B. Demurrers Generally

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. CCP § 430.30(a). In the event a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend should be granted where the complaint’s defect can be cured by amendment. The Swahn Group, Inc. v. Segal (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 831, 852. At demurrer, all facts properly pleaded are treated as admitted, but contentions, deductions and conclusions of fact or law are disregarded. Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591. Similarly, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or facts which are judicially noticed are also disregarded. Coshow v. City of Escondido (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 687, 702. Generally, the pleadings “must allege the ultimate facts necessary to the statement of an actionable claim. It is both improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead the evidence by which he hopes to prove such ultimate facts.” Careau & Co. v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1390; FPI Develop., Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 384. Each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of a party’s proof does not need to be alleged. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 861, 872. Conclusory pleadings are permissible and appropriate where supported by properly pleaded facts. Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6. “The distinction between conclusions of law and ultimate facts is not at all clear and involves at most a matter of degree.” Burks v. Poppy Const. Co. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 463, 473. Leave to amend should generally be granted liberally where there is some reasonable possibility that a party may cure the defect through amendment. Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.

C. Fines and Administrative Orders

“Failure to obtain judicial review of a discretionary administrative action by a petition for a writ of administrative mandate renders the administrative action immune from collateral attack, either by inverse condemnation action or by any other action.” Patrick Media Group, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 592, 608. The 90-day limitation under section 1094.6 “is a procedural limitations provision and, consequently, jurisdictional.” Donnellan v. City of Novato (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1097, 1103. Where an administrative hearing order is not timely appealed, a trial court lacks the power to modify the amount of the penalties. County of Sonoma v. Gustely (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 704, 712.

D. Set Aside of Judgments

Duress is a basis for set aside of judgments under CCP § 473 (b). In re Marriage of King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 108. This includes stipulated judgments. Ibid; In re Marriage of Gonzalez (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 736, 739. Fraud, whether extrinsic or intrinsic, is also basis for set aside of a judgment under CCP § 473 (b). Rice v. Rice (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 646, 651.

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“(A) court, sitting in equity, can set aside or modify a valid final judgment. (Citations.) This power, however, can only be exercised when the circumstances of the case are sufficient to overcome the strong policy favoring the finality of judgments.” Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467, 470. “After relief is no longer available under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 for mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable neglect, an otherwise valid and final judgment may only be set aside if it has been obtained through extrinsic, not intrinsic, fraud.” In re Marriage of Stevenot (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1068. “A judgment could be attacked at any time either by motion or in an independent action in equity on the ground that it was secured by extrinsic fraud.” In re Estrem's Estate (1940) 16 Cal.2d 563, 571.

Equitable set aside has three elements beyond extrinsic fraud or mistake: “First, the defaulted party must demonstrate that it has a meritorious case. Second[ ], the party seeking to set aside the default must articulate a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action. Last[ ], the moving party must demonstrate diligence in seeking to set aside the default once ... discovered.’” Politsch v. Metroplaza Partners, LLC (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 397, 405, quoting Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 982.

“Extrinsic fraud only arises when one party has in some way fraudulently been prevented from presenting his or her claim or defense.” Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1300.

Extrinsic fraud occurs when a party is deprived of the opportunity to present his claim or defense to the court; where he was kept ignorant; or, other than from his own negligence, fraudulently prevented from fully participating in the proceeding. (Citation.) Examples of extrinsic fraud are: concealment of the existence of a community property asset, failure to give notice of the action to the other party, and convincing the other party not to obtain counsel because the matter will not proceed (and then it does proceed). (Citations.) The essence of extrinsic fraud is one party's preventing the other from having his day in court.

City and County of San Francisco v. Cartagena (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1067 (Citations omitted).

II. Evidentiary and Procedural Issues

Defendant requests judicial notice of several documents from the Prior Action (RFJN, Ex. 1-7), as well as Plaintiff’s action against his former attorneys from the Prior Action (RFJN, Ex. 8). The Prior Action, being the basis for Plaintiff’s claim here, is appropriately the subject of judicial notice. Inconsistent allegations across similar suits by Plaintiff are appropriate for judicial notice and consideration on demurrer. Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.

III. Motion to Strike

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Matters are irrelevant if they bear no relation to Plaintiff’s cause of action, are conclusory, or request relief not supported by the facts alleged. Defendant argues that huge portions of the Complaint relate to either facts irrelevant to the merits of his singular cause of action, or relating to other cases entirely.

Many of the allegations the Defendant contends are irrelevant relate at least to Plaintiff, and the facts of the Prior Action. Plaintiff makes various factual allegations regarding his treatment by the Defendant’s code enforcement officers and counsel. These appear at least relevant to the Prior Action, and so appear relevant to any contentions that the judgment thereon should be set aside. While Defendant will likely contend that these matters should be struck in light of the Court’s holding below that Plaintiff has not shown a valid defense to the Prior Action, these matters at least remain relevant to the degree Plaintiff may be capable of amending to state as much. Plaintiff is entitled to contend his factual basis for arguing the Prior Action was defensible, because the alternative is to grant Plaintiff a meaningless leave to amend to show a defense to the administrative decision, without the opportunity to provide the subsequent evidence necessary. Therefore, Defendant’s motion to strike is DENIED as to Complaint ¶ 3, 24, 31-39, 42-48, 50-52, and 54-58.

Plaintiff seeks at the case’s outset to turn the instant litigation into a referendum on the conduct of both Defendant and the court in various cases already before the court in other lawsuits brought by entirely separate plaintiffs. While Plaintiff contends that these cases are evidence, they are clearly collateral matters appropriately litigated in their own case and not subject to either parallel litigation or re-litigation here. Plaintiff asks that the Court make factual findings related to these cases here, but he offers no authority supporting the capability of the Court to offer factual determinations on parties not related to his specific cause of action for set aside of the judgment. While the Court is required to treat Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the naked averment of other alleged misdeeds in cases unrelated to Plaintiff (other than the mutual litigant of Defendant) bear no relevance to the truth of the matters germane to Plaintiff’s cause of action. See CCP § 431.10 (matters are irrelevant if they are not “essential to the statement of a claim”). Plaintiff cannot force them to become relevant by inserting them into a pleading. Fisher v. Nash Bldg. Co. (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 397, 403. Any amendment significant enough to draw these matters into relevance would also be outside of any justifiable leave to amend. Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED without leave to amend as to Complaint ¶ 53, 59-60, 62, 65-68, and Exhibits F-K, N-P and R.

IV. Demurrer

The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was subject to significant and undue pressure by Defendant in the Prior Action, which resulted in substantial health issues. Plaintiff alleges that these pressures, based in part on the fabrication of evidence, resulted in his assent to a stipulated judgment under duress. He therefore seeks to set aside that judgment.

Defendant brings the instant demurrer, arguing that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for set aside of the judgment. Plaintiff opines that the alleged conduct by Defendant’s counsel in the prior case caused him to sign the stipulated judgment under duress, and that forms sufficient basis for set aside of the stipulated judgment.

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Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s represented status in the Prior Action almost entirely forecloses the possibility of extrinsic fraud. The Court is not entirely persuaded that the mere fact that Defendant was represented is sufficient to transmute any extrinsic fraud to intrinsic fraud. Defendant cites to Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Wolfer (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 63, 69, which held that receipt of erroneous legal advice regarding whether a defendant had a meritorious defense is intrinsic fraud, not extrinsic. This contention addresses some of Plaintiff’s allegations but fails to relate to the allegations of duress. To the degree that Plaintiff alleges that his former counsel strongly urged him to take the settlement agreement, this is clearly controlled by Westinghouse. Plaintiff had the benefit of counsel and received a stipulated judgment significantly below the amount sought in the Defendant’s complaint. While Plaintiff contends that his counsel made error, he fails to display that an error occurred. As the Court addresses further below, Plaintiff does not proffer a valid defense to the underlying action, and no other error appears contended. Again, even if the advice was erroneous, it was not passive. Plaintiff actively stipulated to the judgment thereafter. If it is fraud at all, this is intrinsic. Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Wolfer (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 63, 70; contra Politsch v. Metroplaza Partners, LLC (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 397, 405 (erroneous legal advice not to participate in the lawsuit at all might constitute extrinsic factors).

Regardless of Plaintiff’s represented status in the prior case, most of Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the prior action are intrinsic fraud. Plaintiff makes various allegations regarding the misconduct of the Defendant, but each of these allegations go to the executive conduct which preceded the Prior Action, or fraud on the merits of the prior action. These are intrinsic forms of fraud, and do not meet the requirements for equitable set aside of a judgment.

Plaintiff further contends that the Complaint states a cause of action related to equitable set aside because Defendant placed him under duress when he signed the stipulated judgment. Plaintiff primarily relies on In re Marriage of Gonzalez (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 736 (“Gonzalez”). In that case, wife entered into a property settlement agreement before trial with husband which was significantly disadvantageous to her. Id. at 739-740. Wife attributed her willingness to sign the agreement to duress, averring that husband had told her she had to sign the agreement, or he would take their mutual children. Id. at 745-746. Wife filed a recission of the settlement agreement, and the trial court found recission of the agreement justified based on duress. Ibid. The Court of appeal affirmed, finding that there were facts sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of duress. Ibid.

Defendant argues that Gonzalez bears no similarity to the instant case. A point the Defendant fails to directly raise, but appears dispositive to Plaintiff’s line of reasoning, is that there is no case applying principles of duress to separate equitable lawsuits to set aside judgments. However, this is precisely why Defendant’s argument that Gonzalez is distinguishable is accurate. Defendant appears incorrect that Gonzalez bears no similarity to the instant case. Both cases involve settlement agreements undertaken by represented parties, and subsequent efforts to set those agreements aside. Where the cases diverge is in two important respects. First, wife in Gonzalez received her relief in the underlying case, and not in external proceedings, filing the recission just three months after entering the agreement. Id at 739-740. Here, Plaintiff has filed

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this in a separate case, and petitions for equitable relief more than two years after signing the agreement.

Plaintiff nonetheless contends that the facts here are sufficient for equitable relief. However, Plaintiff’s leap in logic is that duress is entitled to the exact same remedies as extrinsic fraud. Simply put, no authority equates duress to fraud, or extends equitable relief to duress. While both extrinsic fraud and duress may cause parties to fail to act within a proceeding, they are distinguishable principles. In the case of extrinsic fraud, a party (typically defendant) is denied the opportunity to present their case due to fraudulent conduct by the other party or a mistake. The policy logic for allowing a party to bring a separate suit for set aside of a judgment based on extrinsic fraud is that the party may not be aware of the facts sufficient to participate in the proceedings, and discovery of those facts would otherwise give rise to reason to set aside the prior judgment. Also possible is that obstacles have rendered the party incapable of participating despite knowledge of the proceeding. See, In re Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 342. Duress may also cause a party to be denied an opportunity to present their case, but duress is nonetheless distinguished from extrinsic fraud because a party cannot profess ignorance of duress. Either the party was so perturbed by the conduct that they acted as they otherwise might not have, and the need to move under CCP § 473 is obvious, or the party was not under duress. No authority extends the right to set aside under duress beyond the confines of a motion under CCP § 473(b). See, e.g., In re Marriage of King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 109 (motion for set aside under duress was untimely.). Extrinsic fraud’s particular subversive nature is the justification for the equitable cause of action to set aside judgment.

This is further supported by the elements required to show set aside due to extrinsic fraud or mistake. Each case dealing with equitable set asides either cited by the parties or located by the Court deal with set aside of a default or proceedings in absentia. See Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 982 (“the moving party must demonstrate diligence in seeking to set aside the default once ... discovered.” [Emphasis added]); In re Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 342 (wife was deported and left unaware of proceedings and unable to participate). What occurred here was not a default. Plaintiff participated in the underlying case, and the averred duress occurred at the courthouse directly before trial. Plaintiff, whether due to fear or not, entered into an agreement and resultant judgment. He was aware of the effect of the agreement, and there is no basis to extend those equitable remedies available to parties left in a deficit of information.

Plaintiff’s other authorities are no more helpful on this issue. Gross v. Needham (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 446, merely defines duress, it does not purport to extend duress to the set aside of judgments. Fraud and duress are both present claims in that case, but that does not render them synonymous. In re Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 342-343, does state that fraud and mistake are “given broad meaning”, but again relate to a party being entirely removed from proceedings (here by deportation), and therefore denied an opportunity to appear at proceedings that proceeded in her absence. This is not instructive as to Plaintiff’s active participation in an action, and (as noted below) apparent availability to litigate. Plaintiff fails to provide authority that the alleged duress is a basis for equitable relief.

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Accordingly, the Court need not answer the question of whether the averred conduct is sufficient to claim duress, because duress is not facts sufficient to constitute Plaintiff’s averred cause of action.

Plaintiff also fails to adequately plead elements of relief, even if he pled facts sufficient to constitute extrinsic fraud or mistake. To the degree that Plaintiff contends that he has a valid defense to the underlying action, he provides no binding authority to this effect. While Plaintiff seeks to challenge the underlying factual contentions in the prior case, as Defendant points out, the court in that case could not reach those merits. The prior action alleges that Plaintiff failed to challenge the administrative decision timely (See Defendant’s RFJN, Ex. 1, ¶ 50), and therefore the court could not make determinations of fact contrary to that decision. Through inaction, Plaintiff rendered any contention regarding cannabis cultivation unassailable by court determination. Patrick Media Group, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 592, 608. Accordingly, his attempt to do so now does not present a meritorious defense to the underlying action. Plaintiff fails to show this element, and accordingly any claim of equitable set aside fails on this account as well.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice also displays that Plaintiff was dilatory in pursuing relief, even if such relief applied. “(T)he moving party must demonstrate diligence in seeking to set aside the default once ... discovered.” Politsch v. Metroplaza Partners, LLC (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 397, 405. Plaintiff signed the stipulated judgment on March 7, 2023. Plaintiff filed a case against his former attorneys on February 21, 2024, alleging their malpractice in representing him in the Prior Action. RFJN, Ex. 8. Based on the allegations therein, it is clear that Plaintiff was “aware” of any fraud (whether intrinsic or extrinsic) resulting from inadequate legal advice by at least that date. However, Plaintiff did not file the instant case until June 10, 2025, more than a year thereafter. Plaintiff makes no allegation sufficient to show why he was capable of bringing an action against his attorneys, but was incapable of timely moving to set aside the stipulated judgment with “diligence”. This appears insufficient to show the required diligence for equitable relief as a matter of law.

While Plaintiff conclusionary asks for other forms of relief related to the perceived injustices alleged, nothing within the Complaint purports to state a cause of action which would justify factual holdings thereon. As is addressed in the motion to strike, these are patently collateral matters irrelevant to Plaintiff’s averred cause of action. This Court may not, through Plaintiff’s inclusion of factual contentions unrelated to his own cause of action, undertake some form of administrative review of the Defendant, usurping the determinations of the court in those cases.

These issues appear almost incurable. However, it is not the purview of the Court to speculate whether such issues are curable or not, as nothing within the Complaint appears to be an admission sufficient to preclude any possibility of relief. In an abundance of caution, leave to amend appears appropriate at this juncture, but the burden from this point is for Plaintiff to demonstrate the viability of the action.

The Demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

V. Conclusion

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Based on the foregoing, the Demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

The motion to strike is GRANTED without leave to amend as to Complaint ¶ 53, 59-60, 62, 65-68, and Exhibits F-K, N-P and R. The remainder of the motion is DENIED.

Defendant shall submit a written order to the Court consistent with this tentative ruling and in compliance with Rule of Court 3.1312(a) and (b).

This is the end of the Tentative Rulings.*

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